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This paper contains a schematic description of selected relevant events in the
development of quantitative macroeconomics since the start of the Cowles
Comission for Economic Research in 1932. It also provides a sketch of what
could be a promising path for future events.1
1. Introduction
Is it possible to find empirical counterparts of demand and cost functions? Can
we obtain quantitative laws of motion which characterise the evolution of
macroeconomic aggregates, such as the levels of production and employment?
Or to go even further, can careful empirical research provide quantitative
guidelines for economic policymakers whose decisions aim to influence the
evolution of their countries’ economies?
Finding answers to this type of questions should be the ultimate, perhaps the
ideal, goal of a science like economics which has a strong quantitative
component and aims to contribute to the improvement of social welfare.
However, up until well into the 20
th century, Economics was essentially a
qualitative field of study. There was naturally an awareness of this shortcoming,
which led economists such as Irving Fisher, Ragnar Frisch, Joseph Schumpeter
and others to found the Econometric Society in 1930 in order to promote the
development of the quantitative side of economic theory. Three years later, in
1933, the society published the first issue of its journal Econometrica,w h i c h
featured an editorial that advocated bringing together economic theory,
mathematics and statistics as a key strategy for progressing in the development
of quantitative economics.
How far has this development come? What is the outlook for further advance in
the near future? The following sections elaborate on these questions focusing
on a selection of relevant events in the development of quantitative
macroeconomics.
2. Conventional Econometrics
Shortly after the Econometric Society was founded, Alfred Cowles contacted
some of the original members. Cowles was president of an investment2
consultancy and was interested in forecasts of stock market evolution and, by
extension, in economic research. The contacts proved fruitful. 1932 saw the
start of the Cowles Commission for Economic Research, which was made up of
members of the Econometric Society (with which it shared its headquarters until
1955) and financed mainly by Cowles.
The Cowles Commission was based in Chicago from 1939 to 1955. During this
time, and particularly during the 1940s, Commission members laid the
groundwork for what could be referred to as “conventional econometrics”,
making two basic contributions to the field: they advocated the use of statistical
inference in economics and developed simultaneous equation models up to an
operational stage, dealing with their identification, estimation and validation.
There are inherent links between these two contributions. On the one hand,
using statistical inference made it necessary to visualise economic data as
generated by a random process. On the other hand, specifications for this
random process had to involve simultaneity because it is a key feature of
economic interactions. The challenge therefore lay in how to use appropriate
statistical techniques to obtain a quantitative version of random simultaneous
equation systems which would reflect the way the economy actually works.
Simultaneous equation systems include up to three types of structural
equations: identities, technological restrictions and rules governing the
behaviour of economic agents. The existence of simultaneity causes problems
of observational equivalence and estimation which do not usually occur when
simultaneity does not exist. The Cowles Commission addressed the problem of
identification by resorting to economic theory and the use of exclusion
restrictions when specifiying econometric models. In addition, it set the basis for
developing the least squares and the maximum likelihood estimation methods
which commonly appear in present text books.
For three decades the Cowles Commission’s econometric principles were the
framework of consensus for the profession and monopolised econometric3
theory and practice. In the specific field of macroeconomics, Klein (1947) was
the first to construct macroeconometric models which could be used in
economic policy decision-making processes. The size of these models
gradually increased. They began to be systematically used to quantify the
macroeconomic impact of different scenarios defined in terms of alternative
paths for the model’s exogeneous variables. During recent years particular
efforts have been made to include rational expectations and arrive at a detailed
modelling of international connections.
1 Nowadays one of the most frequently
cited models is the Wharton Model, of which there are short and medium-term
versions which include more than one thousand equations.
3. Critiques of Conventional Macroeconometrics: Lucas and Sims
In the second half of the 1970s, two authors wrote articles criticising the uses
and basic principles of conventional macroeconometric models: Lucas (1976)
and Sims (1980). Both critiques of the conventional modelling strategy were so
thorough that, according to the authors, it would be advisable to discard this
strategy and seek alternatives that would correct what they considered to be
unacceptable features of the conventional methodology. Indeed, their articles
were very influential in the United States, triggering the start of the research
programmes suggested by the authors.
Lucas and the econometric programme of the rational expectations´ school
Lucas’s critique was perhaps the most revolutionary one. Using arguments
based on the rational expectations hypothesis he dismissed the use of
conventional models in exercises involving assessment of alternative economic
policies.
More specifically, consider the following econometric model:
1 Taylor (1993) is a good example of this line of work.4
Y1 (t) = F (Y1 (t – s) , Y2 (t – s) , s ³ 0;dF)+u 1(t)
(1)
Y2(t) = G (Y2 (t – s) , Y1 (t – s) , s ³ 0;dG)+u 2(t)
w h e r eti sat i m ei n d e x ,u 1 and u2 are model disturbances , dF and dG are
parameter vectors and, for the sake of convenience, the model’s variables have
been separated into a Y1 vector that represents the private sector, and a Y2
vector for economic policymakers. Given G, Lucas argues that expectations
make dF a function of the parameter dG and of the s parameters that
characterise the distribution of the disturbance vector u2(t):
dF =f( dG , s , dP)( 2 )
In other words, the specification of private sector behavioural equations
depends on the control variable generation process (as well as on the dP
parameter vector, which we will discuss shortly). Thus, to the extent that the
alternative scenarios considered for Y2 involve changes in dG and/or s,
evaluating economic policies in the conventional way, i.e. projecting with a
fixed dF, to determine the behaviour of the private sector as regards these
alternative scenarios is incorrect inasmuch as the estimated equations for the
private sector are no longer valid.
A different strategy is required for relevant analyses. This involves estimating
the “deep” parameters. In other words, estimating the dG , s and dP vectors of
parameters, the latter representing agents’ preferences and technology. The
vector dP is assumed to be independent of the stochastic laws that generate the
control variables (dG and s), and appears in (2) by virtue of the optimising
behaviour of the economic agents. Once these parameters have been
estimated, it is possible to make legitimate policy evaluations by combining (1)5
and (2) because the effect of a change in scenario on the process that
describes private sector behaviour is taken into account. This is the underlying
philosophy of the school of rational expectations’ econometric programme,
whose final objective is (Sargent, 1984) to seek policy actions which generate
the most desirable stochastic process for the economy. The aim of this search
is to be able to offer quantitative advice in order to shape government actions
for the years subsequent to the sample period.
The strategy used to obtain the “deep” parameters involves specifying and
solving dynamic optimisation problems under the hypothesis that agents’
expectations are rational. This framework of analysis is adopted with the aim of
interpreting the correlations that usually characterise time series of aggregate
economic data whilst respecting the basic theoretical principle that the agents’
observed behaviour changes when there are changes in the restrictisions they
face (this is the essence of Lucas’s critique).
Solving the optimisation problem generates stochastic laws of motion for the
variables studied which depend on the parameters that characterise the
economic structure used. These “deep” parameters are then estimated and the
underlying economic structure tested. An important consequence of adopting
this framework of analysis is that identification restrictions are available in the
form of non-linear functional relations between the coefficients of the optimal
stochastic laws of motion, which, to some extent, reduces the need for
exclusion restrictions which are typical of conventional econometrics.
Sargent (1981) and Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983) are classic references
in the econometric programme of the rational expectations school which
emerged subsequent to Lucas’ critique.
Sims and the VAR Methodology6
C.A. Sims’ macroeconometric proposal stemmed from a direct criticism of the
methods used to construct conventional models. A description of his arguments
follows.
The validity of the restrictions used to obtain a structural interpretation is crucial
if you aim to defend the idea that there is some connection between reality and
the model used to represent it. Sims argued that the majority of restrictions
used to identify conventional macroeconometric models are unbelievable. They
are not justified by economic theory. Indeed, theory does not provide sufficient
unequivocal restrictions relative to the number of variables and equations
usually included in conventional models. In particular, the exogeneity of many
variables is fictitious rather than real.
Let us look again at the econometric model (1) for purposes of illustration. If, as
is usually assumed in economic practice, F and G are linear, this model suffers
from an identification problem because the two equations are statistically
indistinguishable, making it impossible to decide which of them reflects private
sector behaviour and which reflects the behaviour of economic policymakers. In
order to solve this problem, it has been common practice in conventional
modelling to treat the control vector as exogeneous. In other words, to reduce
equation (1) to the following restricted specification:
Y1 (t) = F (Y1 (t – s) , Y2 (t – s) , s ³ 0;dF)+u 1(t)
(3)
Y2 (t) = G (Y2 (t – s) , s ³ 0;dG)+u 2(t)
where the Y1 vector has been eliminated from equation G and the vectors of
disturbances u1(t) and u2(t) are assumed to be orthogonal. The exogeneity of Y2
clearly guarantees the identification of the F and G equation blocks, but it is
very likely that this is an unjustified assumption inasmuch as policmarkers
responsible for controlling Y2 usually react to the private sector events reflected
in the evolution of Y1.7
Sims maintains that when model identification rests on such a fragile base its
implications in terms of the economy’s underlying interrelations can scarcely be
taken into consideration, which disqualifies it as a tool for empirical analysis.
The methodology proposed by Sims (1980) involves specifying and estimating
macroeconometric models that do not include ap r i o r icontroversial restrictions.
In fact, he proposed specifiying minimally restricted models in which all the
variables with a clear economic content would be treated as endogeneous. The
resulting models are known as Vector Autoregressions (VAR). Models of this
kind are obtained from (1), assuming that F and G are linear and solving for the
contemporaneous value of the endogeneous variables:
Y1(t) = F (Y1 (t – s) , Y2 ( t–s ), s>0;bF)+ e1(t)
(4)
Y2(t) = G (Y2 (t – s) , Y1 ( t–s ), s>0;bG)+e2(t)
Under the assumption that the vector of stochastic disturbances (e1, e2)i sw h i t e
noise, (4) would be the VAR representation of the vector of endogenous
variables (Y1,Y2).
The implementation of Sim’s proposal soon found obstacles which ended up
becoming subjects of discussion and research throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
The first obstacle was the wide parametrisation of VAR models. The second
was the absence of a specific identification proposal, making VAR models
reduced-form models with no economic interpretation. Nowadays, both the
problem of degrees of freedom and the problem of identification have been
solved in a relatively satisfactory way, which has facilitated the spread of VAR
methods and the understanding of their underlying motivation: the
acknowledgement of the fact that there is widespread uncertainty about the
economic data generating process
The immediate consequence of this acknowledgement is that an appropriate
modelling strategy should explicitly include this uncertainty in the model8
specification process in order to treat it systematically and objectively. It is
precisely this idea that justifies Sim’s insistence on keeping restrictions to a
bare minimum so that relevant empirical regularities can be extracted by giving
economic data the most objective reading possible. Development and
instrumentation of this modelling strategy was accompanied by the introduction
of Bayesian statistic techniques which have become one of the distinguishing
features of the VAR methodology.
In addition to Sims (1980), other classic references on VAR methodology are
Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984), Sims (1986), Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard
and Quah (1989).
4. The Econometrics of General Equilibrium
Although based on severe criticism of conventional econometrics, Lucas’ and
Sims’ proposals both share its basic premise that specification, estimation and
statistical testing of equation systems is a valid procedure for comparing
economic theories. However, Kydland and Prescott (1991a, 1996) have recently
questioned their validity.
Kydland and Prescott adopt Lucas’ (1980) proposal that an economic theory is
an explicit set of instructions which generates time series for economic
variables; a model with economic agents which correspond to their real-life
counterparts (consumers, businesses, government); a computerised picture of
the national economy. Their argument is that, according to this definition, the
equation systems used in modern econometrics are not economic theories but
only simple sets of statements about how the economy works. Inasmuch as
testing a theory means that it must first be formulated, the authors conclude that
the statistical test of hypotheses which is customary in econometric practice is
not an appropriate tool for testing economic theories.9
Their alternative proposal for testing economic models is what they call the
computational experiment, a term borrowed from physics in which this validation
method is commonly used.
Generally speaking, the computational experiment involves obtaining the
stochastic laws of motion for the variables under study by using the theory you
want to test and then using a computer simulation of these laws to obtain the
quantitative implications of this theory. In more concrete terms, and as regards
the specific field of economics, Kydland and Prescott describe the
computational experiment as an exercise that takes the following basic
sequence:
(1) Ask the quantitative question you want answered.
(2) Construct an economic model using well-tested theory, i.e. theory that has
been previously tested and provided satisfactory answers.
(3) Assign numerical values to the model parameters so that their simulations
reproduce clearly established empirical regularities. This assignment is
called “model calibration”.
(4) Perform the experiment with the calibrated model. In other words, simulate
the model in order to obtain an answer to your quantitative question. The
more sensitive your simulation is to the model calibration, the less accurate
and answer will be, and vice-versa.
A recent field of study whose development is based on computational
experiments is the Real Business Cycle theory proposed by Kydland and
Prescott (1982,1991b). The specific question they pose is how much the post-
war US economy would have fluctuated had technological shocks been the only
source of macroeconomic variability. They used the neo-classical growth theory
to construct the model. The model is calibrated with the aim of reproducing
some of the average ratios observed in the post-war US economy, among10
them, the ratios of consumption and investment to GDP, the ratio of capital
income and labour income, and the ratios of number of hours worked per
employee and number of employees to the total change registered in the
number of hours worked. The outcome of their experiment revealed that the
variance of the simulated output is 70% of that of the observed output. This
estimate proved robust when various changes were made in the original model.
Inasmuch as statistical inference is not inherent to the computational
experiment, the question that immediately arises is whether the computational
experiment is really an econometric tool. Its advocates insist that it is. In fact,
Kydland and Prescott claim that the original meaning of the term “econometrics”
coined by Frisch and clearly explained in the editorial introducing the first issue
of Econometrica, is to derive quantitative implications from economic theory,
which is precisely the objective of the computational experiment.
The authors continue by pointing out that the meaning of the term contrasts with
current econometrics meaning and practice, which involves estimating
economic relations based on goodness of fit statistical criteria. Kydland and
Prescott stress the distinction between “estimation” and “calibration” as the
differentiating feature between the econometrics of the computational
experiment and the more popular version of econometrics which they call
“systems of equation econometrics”. This approach to econometrics determines
the value of equation parameters in order to obtain the best fit to the variables
(estimation). In contrast, the computational experiment technique selects the
theoretical model constraining its parametrisation with the aim of reproducing
certain well-established stylised facts (calibration).
In the authors’ opinion, the goodness of fit strategy is incorrect because it is the
same as evaluating the explanatory power of certain variables over others on
the grounds of a parametrisation that is deliberately selected in order to
maximise this very explanatory power. They maintain that the model should be
selected in accordance with the quantitative question to be answered and
existing economic theory, and that the credibility of the answer obtained with the11
selected model should not depend on statistical test and fit, but on the validity of
the underlying theory. This validity should be based on the model’s capacity to
reproduce well-established empirical regularities. This ability is suitable for
testing models.
5. The Sceptical View: Scientific Illusion in Empirical Macroeconomics
When economics and natural sciences are compared, one is struck by the
dichotomy between theoretical and empirical economics. This more or less
explicitly corresponds to a classification whereby theoretical economics is
considered a first division player and empirical economics is a second division
player. This classification tends to be based on the perception that formal
econometric studies have had practically no impact on the development of
economic science and leads to a sceptical question of whether the large
amount of resources that has gone into developing formal econometrics has
even been worth the effort. Rather than bringing together a specific line of
thought, this vision can be better described as the shadow of a doubt that
hovers over the profession. It was approached from a particularly nihilistic angle
by Summers (1991), whose arguments are summed up below. He compares
formal econometric analysis with its pragmatic and informal counterpart and
opts for the latter.
In his description, Summers identifies formal econometrics with analyses that
resort to statistical inference in order to estimate structural parameters, test
hypotheses derived from economic theory, and isolate causal relations in
systems with numerous interdependent variables. He points out that, contrary to
the case of empirical work in physics, formal econometric studies contribute
little or nothing to scientific progress in economics. According to the author, this
is revealed in a number of different ways: important theoretical progress in the
past few decades has not required formal econometrics, there is no interest in
replicating their findings even when this is possible, nor can one recall any
formal econometric study which has made a substantial contribution to12
economic science. Summers believes that formal econometrics has so little
impact because it mixes up methodological and substantive contributions,
priding itself on sophisticated methodology when significant empirical research
should be based on new information, not new techniques.
In order to illustrate his point, Summers examines empirical work which has
been classed as relevant in each of the two tendencies he considers dominant
in formal econometrics: the rational expectations school and VAR
macroeconometrics.
The work he selected from the rational expectations school’s econometrics
programme is that of Hansen and Singleton (1982) which attempts to shed light
on how the price of assets is determined. For that purpose these authors
specify a representative agent macroeconomic model, estimate its deep
parameters, and ask whether the model is or is not statistically rejected by the
data, concluding that it is.
Summers criticises this work for failing to contribute anything at all. On the one
hand, simply concluding that the data reject a model which you already knew to
be false (as are all models) is not significant unless the exercise at least
explains the reasons for the deviation of data from theory, thereby suggesting
further streams of research, as, for example, Mehra and Prescott (1985) did
when they suggested that rationalisation of the high risk premium observed
probably requires the Arrow-Debreu framework to be abandoned in favour of an
incomplete market framework.
On the other hand, due to the tremendous uncertainty that characterises the
model specification and, by extension, its parameters it is doubtful that anyone
would be inclined to use Hansen and Singleton´s deep parameters to forecast
the effects of a possible intervention in the economy. Summers concludes that
Hansen and Singleton’s structural estimation and statistical test are no more
than examples of methodological elegance.13
His conclusion is equally negative when he analyses Bernanke’s (1986) work in
the field of VAR macroeconometrics, seeking an empirical discrimination
between the alternative explanations of the positive correlation observed
between aggregate production and money. In his opinion, any one of the
directions of causality established by Bernanke can be interpreted in terms of
inverted cause-effect or plausible alternative, which means that his results do
not establish empirical regularities that could help clarify the traditional debate
about the nature of the correlation between monetary and production
aggregates. For example, Bernanke concludes that credit is a relevant factor in
explaining cyclical fluctations, but nothing in his model denies the possibility of
an increase in credit in anticipation of an expected increase in economic activity
caused by other factors. Generally speaking, Summers considers it fruitless to
attempt to identify directions of causality among variables by resorting to
sophisticated methods of statistical analysis and without introducing information
other than that contained in repeatedly analysed sets of time series.
Summers compares the limited influence of formal econometrics with the
influence of natural experiments along the lines of Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) or, in more general terms, the informal pragmatic empirical analyses
contained in Modigliani and Brumberg (1955), Phillips (1958), Feldstein (1974),
and others. Though this is a simple analysis, it is capable of establishing clear
empirical regularities that stimulate theoretical analysis and lead to progress in
understanding how the economy really works.
Here one is struck by the overwhelming influence of Friedman and Schwartz’s
monetary history on discussions about the macroeconomic effects of money;
the conceptual advance and subsequent research stimulus provided by
Modigliani and Brumberg’s evidence that wealth is an important factor in
explaining consumer spending; the continued timeliness of the Phillips curve; or
the discussion triggered by Feldstein’s evidence of the impact of social security
on private saving.14
In Summers’ opinion an empirical analysis that is able to establish stylised facts
that stimulate explanation is essential if theorists are to be convinced to take the
evidence seriously, reduce their excessive emphasis on internal consistency,
and put an end to the present lack of connection between the two fields of work.
6. Current Situation and Future Prospects
The foregoing description clearly reveals that the field of empirical
macroeconomics is currently in disarray. There are a number of different
tendencies which are difficult to reconcile. Nevertheless, if we look closely at the
above we can manage to identify several contrasting positions which, if brought
together, could mark the start of a path towards future consensus. Specifically,
there are three important and closely related contrasting positions that underlie
the foregoing discussion, and I will conclude this paper by discussing them: (a)
the contrast between natural and social sciences, (b) between descriptive
statistics and statistical inference and (c) between Classical and Bayesian
inference.
Economics is probably the social science which has relied the most on the
learning methods used in the natural sciences. However, as a social science, it
does not have recourse to controlled experimentation. Therefore the
mechanical reproduction of methods that are useful in experimental sciences
might even prove counterproductive. Indeed, whether or not it is possible to
make observations by carrying out controlled experiments is a fundamental
factor in determining whether uncertainty is inherent to a particular field of
study.
Natural sciences can repeat an experiment up to the point where they obtain
relations in which the random component is reduced to a bare minimum, which
would enable them to use a quasi-deterministic rather than a probabilistic
language. However, non-experimental sciences usually have to deal with a
context of great uncertainty and, in consequence, need a probabilistic language.15
Sims (1996) recently underscored the factors which make economics a singular
science: data scarcity, the existence of alternative explanatory theories, and the
pressure for results exercised by decision-makers. Were any one of these
factors to be eliminated, it would not be strictly necessary to use probabilistic
language: if data were abundant we could more accurately discriminate
between alternative theories. If there were only a single theory, discrimination
would be unnecessary. It would also be unnecessary if the effects of the
decisions made were independent of the theory chosen. Unfortunately, taken
together, these three factors render the probabilistic nature of economic
evidence unavoidable.
Moreover, it seems evident that once uncertainty is accepted as an inherent
part of the learning process in economics, it should be treated with the rigour
provided by statistical inference when applied to probabilistic models. In other
words, it is not enough to consider a model sufficiently tested when it is capable
of generating certain empirical regularities which are “similar” to those
observed. If the aim is to discriminate between alternative models then the
meaning of “similar” must be specified and that makes it necessary to define
goodness of fit criteria, thereby moving into the field of statistical inference.
Descriptive statistics is not enough to guarantee the basic principle of modern
scientific discourse, according to which theory should match evidence.
Thus we might ask what type of inference is most suitable for economics:
Classical or Bayesian. Classical methods reflect the specificity of the
experimental sciences for which they were originally developed. As mentioned
earlier, in these sciences it may be feasible to control the level of uncertainty
and reduce it to a error term. In this case it is reasonable to treat the coefficients
of a model as parameters, just as one does with classical inference. However,
in the field of economics the level of uncertainty is high and no distinction can
be made between the uncertainty that affects the co-efficients themselves and
the uncertainty that affects other stochastic elements of the model. In a situation
like this, logic suggests that uncertainty as regards the model itself and16
uncertainty as it affects the model’s components should be treated
symmetrically, giving the whole a stochastic configuration about which data
allow us to learn. This is Bayesian inference, and it therefore seems natural to
use it in economics.
Nowadays it is highly likely that two econometricians will analyse the same
sample information and arrive at different conclusions. This signals a lack of
discipline which reduces the credibility of econometric analysis. The
development of strategies to make specification uncertainty explicit in the
modelling process would provide a disciplinary tool for empirical analysis in
economics. It would allow to systematise such analysis and make it able to
generate shared, widely accepted, and therefore objective relationships just as
physical experiments generate widely accepted relationships in experimental
sciences. This could be a promising path which might eventually lead to a
widely accepted paradigm in the field of empirical macroeconomics, similar to
what the general equilibrium paradigm represents in the field of macroeconomic
theory.
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